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1

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.
CRAIG PHILLIP HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10588

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant appeals from a conviction on jury trial
of the crime of robbery ~n the District Court of Washington County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged in separate informations
with the crime of robbery alleged to have occurred on the
5th day of March, 1965, in Washington County, Utah (R.
5) 1 and with being an habitual criminal. Trial was held
in the district court on November 4 and 5, 1965. The jury
1

Respondent will cite the court document as R., the out of court
hearing transcript as OT, and the testimony of Zella Riding as T.
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returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery charge and the
habitual criminal charge was dismissed. On November 8,
1965, the appellant was ordered committed to the Utah
State Prison. A motion for a new trial was subsequently
made and thereafter denied on November 24, 1965.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the district court should be affirmed, or in the alternative, the
case be remanded to the district court with instructions to
that court to hold a hearing without jury to determine
whether there was sufficient compliance by the police with
the principles laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S.
478 (1964), to have warranted consideration by the jury
of appellant's confession.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 5, 1965, Zella Riding was working in a
grocery store in St. George, Utah (T. 7, 8). At about 9:05
p.m. she and a young boy were in the rear of the store to
obtain groceries to restock the shelves (T. 9). On looking
out of the area into the meat area, she noticed the appellant
standing by the meat counter (T. 9). The appellant told
her it was a "stick up" (T. 10). Mrs. Riding then said,
"You're kidding," and the appellant replied he was serious
(T. 10). He told Mrs. Riding to take the paper money from
the cash register and give it to him (T. 11). Appellant
pulled a pistol from his pocket and said he was serious (T.
10). Mrs. Riding took the money from the cash register,
which totaled about $100.00, and gave it to appellant who
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then fled the store and rode away in an automobile (T. 12).
Subsequently, Mrs. Riding identified appellant as the robber (T. 18).
During the course of trial, certain admissions of the
appellant were offered by the prosecution (OT 3). An out
of court hearing was held to determine their admissibility.
Officer Donald R. Lyman of the Salt Lake City Police Department testified that before interrogating the appellant
at the Salt Lake City jail, he advised the appellant of the
fact that Officer Lyman was investigating a robbery
charge, advised appellant that he could have an attorney
and further advised appellant that anything he had to say
would have to be voluntary and could be used against him.
At no time did the appellant request an attorney, but he
indicated he would make arrangements to obtain a local
attorney (OT 5, 11, 12). Further, Officer Lyman testified
(OT 6):
"Q. (By Mr. Burns)
quest an attorney?

"A.

Did Mr. Hamilton re-

No, he didn't."

Subsequently, the appellant made some admissions relating to the crime. The trial court overruled an objection
to receipt of the admission on a claim that appellant had
requested an attorney and been refused one.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING THE ADMISSIONS OF
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APPELLANT SINCE (1) THE EVIDENCE
WOULD SUPPORT A CONCLUSION APPELLANT DID NOT REQUEST COUNSEL; (2) A
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL PRIOR TO JUNE
13, 1966, ONLY REQUIRED THAT APPELLANT BE WARNED OF A RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT AND (3) APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY WARNED.
The facts in the instant case clearly support the con·
clusion that the appellant did not request an attorney. At
no time was there any testimony from Officer Lyman that
after the advice he gave to the appellant that he could have
an attorney was any request made for an attorney. In fact,
he specifically indicated that appellant did not request an
attorney. The only thing the appellant indicated was that
he was going to attempt to obtain the services of a local at·
torney. He did not request to see the local attorney at that
time, nor was there any evidence in the record that he re·
quested the police to obtain counsel for him or that he
wanted counsel present at the time of his interrogation.
Consequently, with the instant state of the record, it was
well within the prerogative of the trial court to determine
from the facts that there was never any request for counsel.
This being so, it is submitted that there is no basis for the
appellant to claim any denial of his constitutional rights.
In Miranda v. Arizona,, ______ U. S. ______ , 16 L. E. 2d 964,
June 13, 196, the United States Supreme Court laid down
a rather revolutionary series of principles to govern state
and federal police officials in the handling of interroga-
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tions when the suspect is in custody of police officers. The
court stated generally that a suspect must be advised of an
absolute right to remain silent, must be advised that anything he says can be used in evidence against him, must be
informed that he has a right to counsel and that if he cannot afford counsel that counsel will be provided for him.
Further, if the suspect indicates that he desires counsel, or
that he does not desire to talk to the police, all interrogation must cease. It might well be that if the Miranda case
were to govern this situation, the appellant's point on appeal would be well taken. However, this case is not controlled by the decision in Miranda.
Subsequent to the Miranda decision in the case of
Johnson v. New Jersey, ______ U. S. ______ , 16 L. E. 2d 882,
(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States indicated
that the Miranda case was not to be applied retroactively.
The court stated that the decision of Miranda v. Arizona
would apply only to trials begun after the 13th day of June,
1966. The court also indicated that the decision of Escobedo
V. lllinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), was not to be applied retroactively and that it was applicable only to trials commenced after June 22, 1964, the date of the Escobedo decision. Consequently, this case is governed only by the rule
in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra. The Escobedo rule unlike the
Miranda rule does not require termination of an interrogation on the request for counsel.

There has, of course, been a substantial argument
raised as to the effect of the Escobedo decision. The overwhelming majority of cases as are noted in the dissenting
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opinions in the Miranda case had construed Escobedo to
be applicable only where the defendant requested counsel
and was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel. Indeed, the appellant in his brief acknowledges the variance of
authority. cf. People v. Hartgraves, 202 N. E. 2d 33 (Ill.
1964); State v. Hall, 397 P. 2d 261 (1964); State v. Faux,
131 N. W. 84 (Iowa 1964); Anderson v. State, 205 A. 2d
281 (Md. 1964); Bean v. Nevada, 398 P. 2d 251 (Nev.
1965); Davidson v. Uni'.ted States, 347 F. 2d 530, 534 (10th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Childress, 347 F. 2d 488 (7th
Cir. 1965). The cases are collected in the Miranda decision
and in the Brief of Amicus Curiae in Escobedo Cases, by
Ronald Sokol, 1966. The question then is whether Escobedo
required a request for counsel before a warning was re·
quired?
In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the court stated:
"As for the stndards laid down one week ago
in Miranda, if we were persuaded that they had
been fully anticipated by the holding in Escobedo,
we would measure their prospectivity from the same
date. Defendants still to be tried at that time would
be entitled to strict observance of constitutional doc·
trines already clearly foreshadowed. The disagree·
ments among other courts concerning the implica·
tions of Escobedo, however, have impelled us to lay
down additional guidelines for situations not pre·
sented by that case. This we have done in Miranda,
and these O'uidelines are therefore available only to
persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13,
1966. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S., at 409, 15 L.
Ed. 2d at 455, note 3, with reference to Malloy 1·
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 84 S. Ct. 1489
( 1964), and Griffin v. Californi::i, supra."
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The court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, also said that
the courts applying the liberal rule of making advice as to
counsel and the right to remain silent of the defendant
mandatory before admitting a confession or admission had
"perceived the implications of Escobedo and have therefore
anticipated our holding in Miranda." Thus, the court acknowledged that it would not read into Escobedo a requirement that an individual be advised as to his right to remain
silent, unless there was an actual request for counsel. Thus,
it is submitted that the position now urged by the appellant
is available only to cases where the Miranda decision is applicable. In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the court said as
to the meaning of Escobedo that it was limited to its precise holding apart from its broad implications. Thus, it
stated:
"Apart from its broad implications, the precise
holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by
the police during an interrogation may not be used
against the accused at a criminal trial, [where]
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminat·
ing statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent
.. .' 378 U. S. at 490-491, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 986."
Thus, it has been interpreted as saying that unless all the
elements are present, including the request for counsel and
the refusal to supply counsel, there is no requirement that
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the defendant in a pre-Miranda case be advised of his right
to remain silent. 2 Journal of the National District At- '
torneys' Association, p. 122 (1966).
Consequently, even if there was no advice clearly
spelled out to the appellant in the instant case that he had
an absolute right to remain silent, that would not be fatal,
if no request for counsel was, in fact, made. Since the rec- '
ord supports the fact that no request was made, the absence
of advice would not preclude the appellant's conviction.
The respondent submits in addition, that the implications in Officer Lyman's testimony were to the effect that he
did, in fact, advise the appellant that he could remain silent.
At the time Officer Lyman gave his testimony, the prosecution was not compelled as a condition precedent to admission of the evidence to show such advice. State v. Ringo,
14 Utah 79, 377 P. 2d 646 (1963).
Therefore, respondent requests that if this court de·
termines that the Escobedo and Miranda decisions are
applicable to this case, that the case be remanded to
the district court and that under the authority in Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), the judge sitting without ,
jury there determine factually whether the appropriate ad· '
vice to remain silent was given. If the court decides that
the appropriate advice was given, then he may affirm the
judgment. If the court determines that the appropriate
advice was not given, (assuming this court determines that
a request for counsel was, in fact, made), a new trial could
be ordered.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF GRAND
LARCENY.
The facts in the instant case disclose that the appellant, while in the store where Mrs. Riding was working,
told her that it was a stick-up, pulled a gun on her, took
money from the cash register, and fled. All the evidence
indicates robbery. There is no evidence of any kind to
indicate that the sole intention of the appellant was to commit larceny. Indeed, the only evidence offered by the appellant on appeal is the testimony of Mrs. Riding which
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that robbery was, in
fact, committed and that that was the only crime properly
instructed on. The trial court correctly refused the instruction on the lesser included offense.
In a long line of decisions, this court has indicated that
there is no need for a trial court to instruct upon a lesser
included offense unless it is raised by the evidence. In
State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531 (1923), this court
stated:
"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as to
lower grades of the offenses charged should be
given when warranted by the evidence. It is equally
well settled that in a criminal prosecution error cannot be predicated on the omission of the trial court
to instruct as to lesser grades of the offense charged
where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to
a lesser grade. 1 Blashfield, Instructions to Juries
(2d Ed.) § 408."
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In State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929), this
court again noted :
"It is a well settled rule that instructions as to '
lower grades of the offense charged should be given
when warranted by the evidence. It is equally well
settled that in a criminal prosecution error cannot
be predicated on the omission of the trial court to i
instruct as to lesser grades of the offense charged,
where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to :
a lesser grade."
Recently, in State v. Gleason, 17 U. 2d 149, 405 P. 2d
( 1965) , this Court ruled that there was no reason to in·
struct upon the lesser included offenses to the crime of
rape. It was stated:

"The evidence was so overwhelming that he
committed the act that no such instruction was
either necessary or appropriate."
Most recently, in State v. Dodge, 415 P. 2d 212 (1966),
counsel for the appellant raised the same contention that
is now raised before the court. Appellant's counsel again
fails or refuses to acknowledge the overwhelming authority
in Utah case law that an instruction on a lesser included
offense need not be given unless it is raised by the evidence.
In the Dodge case, this court said:
"The facts indisputably show he was attempt· '
ing to peel the safe. The jury would have been com·
posed of unreasonable men had it even considered
that the defendant had 'unlawfully entered' for the
altruistic 'intent to damage property or to injure
a person or annoy the peace and quiet of any occu·
pant therein.' The trial court also would have b~en
an unreasonable person had he given such an 1 ~·
struction. The second degree burglary conviction 15
affirmed.''
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The decision of State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 38 Pac.
1108 (1899), cited by the appellant, does not support the

proposition for which it is cited, since in that case, the
court merely held that the trial court's giving an instruction on a lesser included offense, to wit: attempt, and the
jury return of a conviction on the lesser included offense,
did not preclude the conviction, even though the evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrated the commission of the actual
offense. The case is of no precedential value for this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Both issues raised by the appellant in the instant case
are without merit. Appellant was only entitled to be advised of his right to remain silent if he made an actual
request for counsel. Further, at the time appellant was
prosecuted, the failure to cease interrogation, if he made
a request for counsel, was not required. The evidence in
the instant case clearly shows that a request for counsel was
not made and, therefore, no warning was necessary. Consequently, the only question was the voluntariness of the
confession, which appellant does not assail. The appellant's
contention that an instruction on the lesser included offense
should have been given is frivolous and without merit. This
court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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